# Source Code Examples

## OWASP Juice Shop&#x20;

One route on the OWASP Juice Shop application allows for a CSRF exploit, the route to make changes to your user profile. The _/profile_ HTTP POST route accepts a username body parameter and does not implement any anti-CSRF practices.&#x20;

This can be exploited by the following code:&#x20;

```
<form action="http://localhost:3000/profile" method="POST">
  <input name="username" value="CSRF"/>
  <input type="submit"/>
</form>
<script>document.forms[0].submit();</script>
```

As seen in the code below, there are no anti-CSRF practices implemented in the code. The controller merely checks whether user is logged in on line 19, it then retrieves the id of the user from session cookie. The utils.solveIf function checks whether or not the user successfully solves the challenge. The only requirement for this one challenge is that the above payload form/script are used in the htmledit.squarefree.com domain. When the exploit code above is run on the squarefree domain it adds the HTTP Origin & Referer headers, successfully bypassing that control and allowing the username to be edited.&#x20;

```
//https://github.com/bkimminich/juice-shop/blob/master/routes/updateUserProfile.js
//UpdateUserProfile.js

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2014-2021 Bjoern Kimminich.
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
 */

const models = require('../models/index')
const insecurity = require('../lib/insecurity')
const utils = require('../lib/utils')
const cache = require('../data/datacache')
const challenges = cache.challenges

module.exports = function updateUserProfile () {
  return (req, res, next) => {
    const loggedInUser = insecurity.authenticatedUsers.get(req.cookies.token)

    if (loggedInUser) {
      models.User.findByPk(loggedInUser.data.id).then(user => {
        utils.solveIf(challenges.csrfChallenge, () => {
          return ((req.headers.origin && req.headers.origin.includes('://htmledit.squarefree.com')) ||
            (req.headers.referer && req.headers.referer.includes('://htmledit.squarefree.com'))) &&
            req.body.username !== user.username
        })
        user.update({ username: req.body.username }).then(newuser => {
          newuser = utils.queryResultToJson(newuser)
          const updatedToken = insecurity.authorize(newuser)
          insecurity.authenticatedUsers.put(updatedToken, newuser)
          res.cookie('token', updatedToken)
          res.location(process.env.BASE_PATH + '/profile')
          res.redirect(process.env.BASE_PATH + '/profile')
        })
      }).catch(error => {
        next(error)
      })
    } else {
      next(new Error('Blocked illegal activity by ' + req.connection.remoteAddress))
    }
  }
}
```

&#x20;The only requirement to solve this challenge was to use the CSRF exploit code on the htmledit.squarefree.com application to have that domain in the Referer and Origin HTTP Headers. There is no CSRF token in use.&#x20;

## Damn Vulnerable Web App (DVWA)

The following contains source code files from the DVWA.

The examples reviewed below are for the CSRF vulnerability challenge in DVWA. The functionality in the CSRF challenges is for changing a users password.&#x20;

### DVWA CSRF Low Level Security&#x20;

The number one thing that sticks out is that the password change functionality does not force the user to supply their existing password to validate it. This is a bad practice (unrelated to the CSRF finding).&#x20;

Besides that there are no CSRF protections in this code, the code merely checks if both passwords supplied are the same then updates the password for that user. So any user supplied this link that clicks on it will have their password changed to 'abc123' if they are logged into the application in another browser tab:_`https://DVWA/dvwa/vulnerabilities/csrf/?password_new=abc123&password_conf=abc123&Change=Change`_

```
//https://github.com/digininja/DVWA/blob/master/vulnerabilities/csrf/source/low.php
//Low.php 

<?php

if( isset( $_GET[ 'Change' ] ) ) {
	// Get input
	$pass_new  = $_GET[ 'password_new' ];
	$pass_conf = $_GET[ 'password_conf' ];

	// Do the passwords match?
	if( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) {
		// They do!
		$pass_new = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $pass_new ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
		$pass_new = md5( $pass_new );

		// Update the database
		$insert = "UPDATE `users` SET password = '$pass_new' WHERE user = '" . dvwaCurrentUser() . "';";
		$result = mysqli_query($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $insert ) or die( '<pre>' . ((is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_error($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) : (($___mysqli_res = mysqli_connect_error()) ? $___mysqli_res : false)) . '</pre>' );

		// Feedback for the user
		$html .= "<pre>Password Changed.</pre>";
	}
	else {
		// Issue with passwords matching
		$html .= "<pre>Passwords did not match.</pre>";
	}

	((is_null($___mysqli_res = mysqli_close($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]))) ? false : $___mysqli_res);
}

?>
```

####

### DVWA CSRF Medium Level Security &#x20;

The Medium level of this csrf example controller password reset implements the addition of the code on line 5. This code checks whether the HTTP Header Referer and Server name match. Supplying the correct referer will bypass this protection. `Referer: https://DVWA/DVWA-master/vulnerabilities/csrf/`

```
<?php

if( isset( $_GET[ 'Change' ] ) ) {
	// Checks to see where the request came from
	if( stripos( $_SERVER[ 'HTTP_REFERER' ] ,$_SERVER[ 'SERVER_NAME' ]) !== false ) {
		// Get input
		$pass_new  = $_GET[ 'password_new' ];
		$pass_conf = $_GET[ 'password_conf' ];

		// Do the passwords match?
		if( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) {
			// They do!
			$pass_new = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $pass_new ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
			$pass_new = md5( $pass_new );

			// Update the database
			$insert = "UPDATE `users` SET password = '$pass_new' WHERE user = '" . dvwaCurrentUser() . "';";
			$result = mysqli_query($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $insert ) or die( '<pre>' . ((is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_error($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) : (($___mysqli_res = mysqli_connect_error()) ? $___mysqli_res : false)) . '</pre>' );

			// Feedback for the user
			$html .= "<pre>Password Changed.</pre>";
		}
		else {
			// Issue with passwords matching
			$html .= "<pre>Passwords did not match.</pre>";
		}
	}
	else {
		// Didn't come from a trusted source
		$html .= "<pre>That request didn't look correct.</pre>";
	}

	((is_null($___mysqli_res = mysqli_close($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]))) ? false : $___mysqli_res);
}

?>
```

### DVWA CSRF High Level Security&#x20;

The high level code implements a CSRF token that is generated and supplied with the form, in the user\_token field,  to change the password client side. The code on line 5 checks whether this unique nonce (CSRF token) is correct. This is not exploitable directly, but using a combined exploit with XSS it is possible to extract this token to bypass this protection. However by itself if there were no other vulnerabilities that could be chained on this app, this code would be a sufficient CSRF protection however the Impossible level code is superior in that it sanitizes and checks the existence of the supplied password (see section below). &#x20;

```
<?php

if( isset( $_GET[ 'Change' ] ) ) {
	// Check Anti-CSRF token
	checkToken( $_REQUEST[ 'user_token' ], $_SESSION[ 'session_token' ], 'index.php' );

	// Get input
	$pass_new  = $_GET[ 'password_new' ];
	$pass_conf = $_GET[ 'password_conf' ];

	// Do the passwords match?
	if( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) {
		// They do!
		$pass_new = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $pass_new ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
		$pass_new = md5( $pass_new );

		// Update the database
		$insert = "UPDATE `users` SET password = '$pass_new' WHERE user = '" . dvwaCurrentUser() . "';";
		$result = mysqli_query($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $insert ) or die( '<pre>' . ((is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_error($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) : (($___mysqli_res = mysqli_connect_error()) ? $___mysqli_res : false)) . '</pre>' );

		// Feedback for the user
		$html .= "<pre>Password Changed.</pre>";
	}
	else {
		// Issue with passwords matching
		$html .= "<pre>Passwords did not match.</pre>";
	}

	((is_null($___mysqli_res = mysqli_close($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]))) ? false : $___mysqli_res);
}

// Generate Anti-CSRF token
generateSessionToken();

?>
```

### DVWA CSRF Impossible Level Security&#x20;

This code checks the CSRF token, checks the current existing user password to ensure the user knows it, and sanitizes user input for the SQL queries.&#x20;

```
<?php

if( isset( $_GET[ 'Change' ] ) ) {
	// Check Anti-CSRF token
	checkToken( $_REQUEST[ 'user_token' ], $_SESSION[ 'session_token' ], 'index.php' );

	// Get input
	$pass_curr = $_GET[ 'password_current' ];
	$pass_new  = $_GET[ 'password_new' ];
	$pass_conf = $_GET[ 'password_conf' ];

	// Sanitise current password input
	$pass_curr = stripslashes( $pass_curr );
	$pass_curr = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $pass_curr ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
	$pass_curr = md5( $pass_curr );

	// Check that the current password is correct
	$data = $db->prepare( 'SELECT password FROM users WHERE user = (:user) AND password = (:password) LIMIT 1;' );
	$data->bindParam( ':user', dvwaCurrentUser(), PDO::PARAM_STR );
	$data->bindParam( ':password', $pass_curr, PDO::PARAM_STR );
	$data->execute();

	// Do both new passwords match and does the current password match the user?
	if( ( $pass_new == $pass_conf ) && ( $data->rowCount() == 1 ) ) {
		// It does!
		$pass_new = stripslashes( $pass_new );
		$pass_new = ((isset($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"]) && is_object($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"])) ? mysqli_real_escape_string($GLOBALS["___mysqli_ston"],  $pass_new ) : ((trigger_error("[MySQLConverterToo] Fix the mysql_escape_string() call! This code does not work.", E_USER_ERROR)) ? "" : ""));
		$pass_new = md5( $pass_new );

		// Update database with new password
		$data = $db->prepare( 'UPDATE users SET password = (:password) WHERE user = (:user);' );
		$data->bindParam( ':password', $pass_new, PDO::PARAM_STR );
		$data->bindParam( ':user', dvwaCurrentUser(), PDO::PARAM_STR );
		$data->execute();

		// Feedback for the user
		$html .= "<pre>Password Changed.</pre>";
	}
	else {
		// Issue with passwords matching
		$html .= "<pre>Passwords did not match or current password incorrect.</pre>";
	}
}

// Generate Anti-CSRF token
generateSessionToken();

?>
```
